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IRREGULAR

DIvoRCE;

ATTAcK BY FOREIGN JURISDICTION.--

An extremely interesting question was presented for adjudication in
the recent case of Pemberton v. Hughes, 1 Ch. 781 (1899), and was
the subject of a very full diicussion.
In 1884 the plaintiff and one Erwin, both being domiciled in
Florida, were married in that State. In 1888 Erwin, both parties
being still resident in Florida, applied for and obtained from a Florida
court a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of his wife's violent
and ungovernable temper, the plaintiff neither appearing nor opposing the proceedings. Subsequently the plaintiff married one Pem118
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berton, and now, Pemberton having died, the plaintiff seeks to
recover a rent charge which her husband, Pemberton, had created
on certain English estates in her favor. The reversioners defended
on the ground that the Florida divorce was irregular and invalid in
that the subpoena to appear did not leave-as was required by the
rules of the court-ten clear days between the date of the writ and
the time fixed for the wife's appearance.
In arriving at its conclusion the court disregarded the fact that
the decree of the Florida court was being collaterally attackedupon which it might well have based its judgment-Ousey v. Lehigh
Val. Trust and S. D. Co. 84 Fed. 602 (1897) ; Anderson v. Chicago
T. andl Trust Co. 77 N. W. R. 710 (1899) ; Isaacs v. Price,2 Dill.
371 (1872)-and founds its ruling upon the broad ground that,
under the rules of international comity, a judgment of a foreign
court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter will not
be inquired into; that "for international purposes the jurisdiction
observexact L.
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The contention
hence the decree rendered was not one of a court of competent
jurisdiction. This argument the court very properly overruled, for
it is now well settled that jurisdiction for international purposes is
clearly distinct from that for municipal purposes. In the former
case jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in a suit depends solely on
the right to summon a person before the tribunal to defend the suit,
the competency of the court being the sole test. Piggott on Foreign
Judgments (2d ed.), p. 129 el seq.; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, §792
et seq.
In this country, as in England, a decree of divorce, in so far as it
affects the status of the parties, is a judgment in rem, and consequently the same conclusion would be reached in our own courts.
The general rule as to judgments in rem being that a final judgment
pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction will be accepted as
absolutely conclusive as to the merits of the controversy which it
settles, it follows that such a judgment will not be impeached for a
mere error in procedure; Townsend v. Van Buskirk 48 N.Y. Supl.
260 (1897); Kiess v. Faron, 118 Cal. 142 (1897).

MORTGAGE; CLOG ow EquiTY OF REDEMP'Iox.-Santley v.
-Wilde, L. R. 1 Ch. 747 (1899). Ever since the Court of Chancery
intervened on behalf of the mortgagor when his estate was lost to
him at law from failure to redeem by the appointed time, and gave
to him, as a means of retrieving his property, the so-called "equity
of redemption," this creature of equity seems to have been one of its
peculiar favorites. Adopted, as it seems, from the Roman law, it
is held an inherent part in all mortgages: Jones on Mortgages, Vol.
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II, 105, §1038; Lee v. Evans, 8 Cal., 424 (1857); Wilmerding v.
Mitchell, 42 N. J. L. 476 (1880); Benzein v. Lenoir,1 Dev. Eq. (16
N. Car.), 225 (1828), etc., etc. So jealously is it guarded that the
mortgagor is not allowed by express agreement to divest himself of
this right. No matter how clearly his intentions may be expressed,
equity, with tender solicitude, as it were, lest he may have been
impelled to such agreement by the hardship of circumstances, gives
back to him what he has waived. In EastIndiaCo. v. Atkyns, Comyns
347, 349 (1791), it is said that if a man makes a mortgage and
covenants not to bring a bill to redeem, nay, if he goes so far, as in
Stisted's case, to take an oath that he will not redeem, yet he shall
redeem. And see also 2 Story's Eq. Juris., §1019, and cases cited;
Willets v. Burgess, 34 Ills. 494 (1864); Baxter v. Child, 39 Me.
110 (1855); Henry v. Davis, 7 Johns (N. Y.), Ch. 40 (1823), etc.
So if there be an agreement to restrict this equity of redemption
either as to time or persons, if the restriction is a substantial denial
of the right to redeem it will be void. F/oyerv. Lavington, 1 P. Wins.
269 (1714); Newcomb v. Bonham, 1 Vernon, 7 (1681), etc. But the
right to redeem may be postponed for a reasonable time, but not so
far as to become oppressive: Talbot v. Braddill, Vernon 183
(1683).
To the principles above stated Mr.
Jones in the volume on " Mortgages," cited above, adds, §1044: "Neither is the mortgagee allowed
to obtain a collateral advantage under the color of a mortgage, which
does not strictly belong to the contract," and cites as illustrations of
of the year it shall become part of the principal, an agreement for

payment of a commission upon the rents collected by the mortgagee,
etc. le coses his discussion of this point with a quotation from the
case of .ennings v. Ward, 2 Vernon, 520 (1703) : "A man shall
not have interest for hi""
money, and a collateral advantage besides
for the loan of it, or clog the redemption with any by-agreement."
This seemed for a while to be a fair embodiment of the law, as illustrated by the cases of Broad v. Lelfe, 11 W. R.1036 (1863); James
v. Kerr, 40 Ch. D. 449 (1889); Field v. Hopkins, 44 Ch. D. 524
(1890).
But in Biggs v. Hoddinott,.L. R. 2 Ch. 307 (1898), we find a
modification of the doctrine 'as above stated. In that case a mortgage of a hotel to a brewer contained a covenant by the mortgagors
that during the continuance of the security they would deal exclusively with the' mortgagee for all beer and malt liquor sold on the
premises. The deed also contained provisos for the continuance of
the loan for five years. The mortgagors having ceased to purchase
beer of the mortgagee, he now moved for an injunction to restrain
the breach of this covenant; the inortgagors also claimed to be entitled to redeem before the expiration of five years. The injunction
was granted and the redemption before the expirati6n" of five years
was refused as not being an unreasonable restriction, the court laying
down the principle that a mortgagee may stipulate for a collateral
advantage at the time and as a term of the advance, provided the
equity of redemption is not thereby fettered and the bargain is a fair
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and reasonable one, entered into between the parties while on equal
terms, without any improper pressure, unfair dealing or undue
influence.
Last year (1899) a case arose in the Chancery Division involving
the same principles, but falling on the other side of the line, it being
there held that the collateral agreement was a clog on the equity of
redemption, unreasonable as practically a denial of the right to
redeem, and therefore void. This was the case of Santley v. Wilde,
L. R., 1 Ch. 747. Here the sub-lessee of a theatre executed
a mortgage for a valuable consideration on the term and agreed
thereby to pay £2000 (the amount advanced by inortgagee), together
with interest thereon at 6 per cent, and also to pay to the mortgagee
one-thirdthe clear net profit rental of the theatre. The mortgage was
for the whole of the term less one day, and was redeemable only on
payment of £2000, with interest, and all other moneys covenanted to
be paid. This latter clause practically rendered it impossible to
redeem before the end of the term, because only with the passing of
time could the amount of such moneys due be ascertained. It was
held, therefore, by Mr. Justice Byrne, in line with the principles of
Biggs v. Hoddinott, supra, that this agreement was void, not simply
because a collateral advantage was sought by the mortgagee out of
the mortgaged property, but because such collateral advantage was
an illegal clog on the equity of redemption.
What was said in Jennings v. Ward, supra, seems therefore to
require some alteration, and the principle deducible from the cases
would require it to read: "'A man shall not have interest for his
money, and a collateral advantage besides for the loan of it,' if such
'by-agreement clog the redemption.'"
The question, then, as to what cnllateral advantage may be taken
is to be decided with reference to its effect upon the equity of redemption, and under the rule above leaves, to a large extent, each case
upon its own peculiar footing, and gives a convenient discretion to
the Chancellor as to what should or should not be considered an
unreasonable fetter on the equity of redemption.

